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Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical 
Examination of the Man and the Metaphor 
As President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson refused 
to declare a national day of fasting, reasoning that  the first 
amendment had created "a wall of separation between church 
and State."' As a Virginia legislator, however, he sponsored a bill 
giving the Governor the power to declare days of fasting and 
thank~giving.~ Jefferson's "wall" is a well-remembered and oft- 
quoted metaphor; his "Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fasting 
and Thanksgiving" is large forgotten. This apparent inconsist- 
ency invites further analysis. Indeed, a knowledge of how Jeffer- 
son could consistently believe that a Governor could declare a fast 
day while a President could not is essential to an understanding 
of the wall metaphor. A careful study of Jefferson's actions and 
utterances over the span of his life reveals that the Master of 
Monticello saw in the religion clauses of the first amendment 
more than a wall of separation between church and state; to him, 
they constituted a study in federalism. 
Because of the federal nature of the United States, any dis- 
cussion of church-state relationships is immediately complicated 
by the fact that there is not just one "state" to be concerned with, 
but two-the federal "state" and the state "state." Thus, the first 
amendment religion clauses address two basic issues: First, what 
is the proper relationship between the federal government and 
religion? Second, what is the proper relationship between state 
government and religion? A third, corollary issue arises from the 
first two: Who shall have jurisdiction over religious questions, the 
federal government or the state g~vernment?~  Jefferson identified 
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), 
reprinted in S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE J FFERSON 518-19 (2d ed. 1969) and THE WORKS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 346 (P. Ford ed. 1905) [hereinafter cited as WORKS OF JEFFERSON]. 
2. 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 556 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as 
PAPERS OF JEFFERSON]. 
3. This third issue could be further subdivided; i. e., Who shall have jurisdiction over 
federal religious questions and who shall have jurisdiction over state religious questions? 
As will be shown below, however, Jefferson felt that all authority over religious questions 
had been reserved by the states, and he never seems to have addressed the issue a t  the 
federal level. On one occasion he did approve a treaty with the Kaskaski Indians which 
included a federal grant to the tribe for building a church and employing a Catholic priest 
to teach and minister to them. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, CLASS 2 , l  INDIAN AFFAIRS NO. 104, 
8th Cong., 1st Sess. 687 (W. Lowrie & M. Clarke eds. 1832). Since Jefferson made no 
specific comment as to the subsidy, we can only speculate concerning his motives on that 
occasion. 
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these three issues and dealt with all of them in his writings and 
public activities. This Comment will examine Jefferson's views 
on these issues in an effort to better understand his use of the wall 
metaphor. No attempt will be made here to present a broad anal- 
ysis of the historical justification for judicial review of state action 
under the first and fourteenth amendments. Rather, this Com- 
ment will first examine modern judicial use and interpretation of 
Jefferson's wall metaphor and then determine the extent to which 
judicial construction of the phrase comports with Jeffersonian 
church-state and federal-state philosophies. 
A. The Supreme Court 
Jefferson's now-famous phrase "wall of separation between 
church and State" was resurrected from obscurity by Justice 
Black in the 1947 decision of Everson u. Board of Ed~cat ion .~  
Justice Black cited it as the sole historical justification for his 
definition of the establishment clause of the first amendment: 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend- 
ment means at  least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Gov- 
ernment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid 
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. 
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain 
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief 
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for enter- 
taining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or 
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institu- 
tions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Fed- 
eral Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the af- 
fairs of any religions organizations or groups and vice versa. In 
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of reli- 
gion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between 
church and State."" 
After Euerson the wall metaphor appeared thirteen times in 
the next major Supreme Court church-state cases, McCollum u. 
4. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). The "wall" metaphor first appeared in a United States 
Supreme Court decision in 1878, when Chief Justice Waite quoted Jefferson's Danbury 
letter in the Mormon polygamy case, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
It was not quoted again by the Court until Everson. 
5. 330 U.S. at 15-16. 
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Board of EducationQmd Zorach v. C l a ~ s o n , ~  both of which in- 
volved religious released time programs. The metaphor lay dor- 
mant until the early 1960's when it again saw frequent use%efore 
falling into disuse again, possibly due to criticism from legal 
scholars.' Despite the criticism, Justice Black revived the meta- 
phor in his 1968 dissent to Board of Education v. Allen.'" Thus 
rejuvenated, the wall language soon reappeared in a majority 
opinion, Epperson v. Arkansas,ll where it was used in striking 
down Arkansas' antievolution statute. 
The 1970's opened with three cases whose language boded ill 
for the metaphor's future utility. In upholding the constitution- 
ality of tax exemptions for churches, Chief Justice Burger stated, 
"The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an 
absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic pur- 
pose of [the religion clauses]."12 Justice Marshall continued the 
attack on the wall in Gillette v. United States: "The metaphor 
of a 'wall' or impassable barrier between Church and State, taken 
too literally, may mislead constitutional analysis . . . ."I" few 
months later, Chief Justice Burger attempted to deal the trouble- 
some metaphor a death blow: "Judicial caveats against entangle- 
ment must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 
'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on 
all the circumstances of a particular relationship."I4 
Despite the Chief Justice's efforts to do away with the wall, 
Justice Powell soon succumbed to the seemingly irresistible urge 
to employ Jefferson's language in first amendment religion cases. 
6. 333 U.S. 203, 211, 212 (1948); id. at 213, 225, 231 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. 
at 244 n.8, 247 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
7. 343 U.S. 306,317 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); id. a t  325 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
8. In four Supreme Court decisions from 1961 to 1963, the wall appeared a t  least six 
more times in opinions on issues ranging from Sunday closing laws to prayers and Bible 
reading in public schools. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 
367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961); McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443 (1961); id. a t  461 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
9. Dallin Oaks' criticism was typical: 
The modern popularity of the wall metaphor should not conceal its inappropri- 
ateness as an expression of current church-state relationships. Certainly there 
is something anomalous about a wall that will admit a school bus without the - 
"slightest breach," but is impermeable to a prayer. . . . The metaphor is not 
an aid to thought and it can be a positive barrier to communication. 
THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 2, 3 (D. Oaks ed. 1963) (footnotes omitted). 
10. 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting). 
11. 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968). 
12. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). 
13. 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971). 
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U S .  602, 614 (1971). 
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In striking down a statutory system providing income tax bene- 
fits to parents of children attending New York nonpublic schools, 
Justice Powell admitted that "this Nation's history has not been 
one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State."'" 
He quickly added, however, that "[nleither . . . may it be said 
that Jefferson's metaphoric 'wall of separation' between Church 
and State has become 'as winding as the famous serpentine wall' 
he designed for the University of Virginia.'Yn a historical sketch 
of the establishment clause, provided by Justice Powell in a foot- 
note, he equated the wall of separation with Thomas Jefferson's 
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom: "In Jefferson's perspec- 
tive, so vital was this 'wall of separation' to the perpetuation of 
democratic institutions that it was this Bill . . . that he wished 
to have inscribed on his t ~ m b s t o n e , " ~ ~  
Although Justice Powell left the wall in good repair in 1973, 
the phrase again lay idleiR until June 1977 when sharp disagree- 
ment over its proper definition surfaced once again in Wolman v. 
Walter, I5nother case involving state aid to sectarian schools. In 
writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun incorporated the 
Chief Justice's attempted "death blow" into his definition of the 
wall: "[Tlhe wall of separation that must be maintained be- 
tween church and state 'is a blurred, indistinct, and variable 
barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular rela- 
tionship.' "20 This "indistinct" standard provoked rejoinders from 
Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall, both of whom expressed 
dismay that "[wlhat should be a 'high and impregnable' wall 
between church and state, has been reduced to a 'blurred, indis- 
tinct, and variable barrier' "2' that is "incapable of performing its 
vital functions of protecting both church and state."22 The 
Wol man decision underscores the extent of the Court's internal 
disagreement as to the modern application or relevance of the 
wall me taph~r .~"  
15. committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U S .  756, 760 (1973). 
16. Id. a t  761. Justice Powell's reference is to Justice Jackson's sarcastic concurring 
opinion in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,238 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
17. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 n.28 (1973). 
18. There was one obscure, passing reference to the wall in Leutkemeyer v. Kauf- 
mann, 419 U S .  888, 890 (1974) (White, J., dissenting from summary affirmation on 
appeal). 
19. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
20. Id. at  236. 
21. Id. a t  266 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
22. Id. at  257 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
23. This disagreement is aptly illustrated by the extraordinary voting record of the 
Justices on this case: 
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B. Lower Federal Courts and State Courts 
Supreme Court disagreement over whether the wall in the 
metaphor is "high and impregnable" or "blurred, indistinct, and 
variable" has not diminished the frequency of the metaphor's use 
in state and lower federal court decisions. A review of decisions 
in eleven states" since 1966 reveals nineteen appearances of the 
wall language .2Y3ince 1966, federal circuit courts have employed 
the metaphor thirteen times in ten different cases." During the 
same period, the district courts have used the phrase in at least 
twenty decisions,27 one of the latest instances occuring in 
Blackmun, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opin- 
ion of the Court with respect to Parts I, V, VI, VII, and VIII, in which Stewart 
and Stevens, JJ., joined; in which as to Part I, Burger, C.J., and Brennan, 
Marshall, and Powell, JJ., also joined; in which as to Part V, Burger, C.J., and 
Marshall and Powell, JJ., also joined; in which as to Part VI, Burger, C.J., and 
Powell, J., also joined; in which as to Parts VII and VIII, Brennan and Marshall, 
JJ., also joined; and an opinion in which as to Parts 11,111, and IV, Burger, C.J., 
and Stewart and Powell, JJ., joined. Burger, C.J., dissented from Parts VII and 
VIII. Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., filed opinions concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part. White and 
Rehnquist, JJ., filed a statement concurring in the judgment in part and dis- 
senting in part. 
Id. at 231-32. See also McDaniel v. Paty, 98 S. Ct. 1322, 1330, 1333 (1978) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
24. The states included: California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mis- 
souri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
25. California Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 12 Cal. 2d 593, 599, 526 P.2d 513, 517, 
116 Cal. Rptr. 361, 365 (1974); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School, 68 Cal. 
App. 3d 1, 9, 16, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 47, 52 (Ct. App. 1977); Mandell v. Hodges, 54 Cal. 
App. 3d 596, 610, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 253 (1976); Baldwin v. Mills, 344 So. 2d 259, 260 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Board of Educ. v. Bakalis, 54 Ill. 2d 448, 454, 299 N.E.2d 737, 
740 (1973); Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711,722 (Mo.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1029 (1976); Resnick v. Reform Temple, 389 A.2d 944, 960 (N.J. 1978); Schaad v. Ocean 
Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, 72 N.J. 237, 280, 370 A.2d 449, 472 (1977) (Pashman, J., 
concurring and dissenting); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 449, 472 (1977) (Pashman, J., con- 
curring and dissenting); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 116, 228 N.E.2d 791,794 
281 N.Y.S.2d 799, 804 (1967), aff'd, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); id. a t  120, 228 N.E.2d at 797, 
281 N.Y.S.2d at 807 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting); Rhoades v. Abington Township, 424 
Pa. 202, 231, 226 A.2d 53, 69 (1967) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
26. Tate v. Akers, 565 F.2d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 1977) (Barrett, J., dissenting); 
Meltzer v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 548 F.2d 559,580 (5th Cir. 1977) (Gee, J., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544,555 (6th Cir. 1975) 
(Celebrezze, J., dissenting), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 
490 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 664 (4th Cir. 1974) (Widener, 
J., dissenting); Americans United Inc. v. Walten, 477 F.2d 1169, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
reu'd, 416 U.S. 752 (1974); O'Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 790 (3d Cir. 1973); McClure 
v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); Gittle- 
macker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 ,4  (3d Cir. 1970); In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439, 448 n.3 (8th 
Cir. 1970). 
27. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316, 1322 (D. Minn. 
1978); Rhode Island Chapter, Associated Gen'l Contractors of America, Inc. v. Kreps, 450 
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Hernandez v. H a n s ~ n , ~ ~  a Nebraska case decided shortly before 
Wolman. A school principal's power to prohibit the distribution 
of sectarian literature was questioned, but the district court ruled 
in the principal's favor, reasoning that " '[alfter all the States 
have been told about keeping the "wall between church and state 
. . . high and impregnable," . . . it would be rather bitter irony 
to chastise [the defendants] for having built the wall too tall and 
too strong.' "2Wne is left to wonder a t  the irony of that remark 
in view of the Wolman colloquy. 
Despite the abundant use of the wall metaphor in judicial 
decisions over the past thirty years, and the corresponding schol- 
arly comments on the subject, there has been no apparent at- 
tempt to investigate seriously the metaphor in light of Jefferson's 
political beliefs. The statement has been accepted as absolute, as 
if Jefferson had uttered it in a philosophical vacuum, without any 
attempt to integrate the statement into the whole of Jefferson's 
thought on the subject. The context in which he uttered the state- 
ment and his later attempts to explain and modify his position 
have been largely ignored. Jefferson's beliefs concerning the im- 
plications of the first amendment for federalism have for the most 
part been consigned to historical oblivion by the courts. Further- 
more, no attempt has been made to explain Jefferson's political 
actions in the light of his theories regarding church-state relation- 
ships. A discussion of these factors may help clear away the 
thorny mass of confusion that has grown up around the wall. 
F. Supp. 338, 360 n.26 (D.R.I. 1978); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1312 (D.N.J. 
1977); Lendall v. Cook, 432 F. Supp. 971, 978 (E.D. Ark. 1977); Marshall v. Pacific Union 
Conference of Seventh Day Adventist, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. T[ 7806, a t  5956, 5957,81 Lab. 
Cas. T[ 33,536 at  47,849,47,850 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Hernandez v. Hanson, 430 F. Supp. 1154, 
1162 (D. Neb. 1977); Kleid v. Board of Educ., 406 F. Supp. 902, 907 (W.D. Ky. 1976); 
Americans United v. Benton, 413 F. Supp. 955, 959 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Smith v. Smith, 
391 F. Supp. 443, 447 (W.D. Va.), rev'd, 523 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 1073 (1976); Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Ameri- 
cans United v. Bubb, 379 F. Supp. 872, 886 (D. Kan. 1974); Americans United v. Board 
of Educ., 369 F. Supp. 1059, 1065 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist., 
394 F. Supp. 417, 424 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 348 F. Supp. 
1170, 1173 (D. Utah 1972); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 407 (S.D. Ohio 1972), 
vacated, 421 U.S. 982 (1975); Hunt v. Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (S.D.W. 
Va. 1971); Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Brown v. Reaves, 294 F. 
Supp. 858, 860 n.2 (W.D. La. 1966); Gilliam v. Reaves, 263 F. Supp. 378, 382 n.5 (W.D. 
La. 1966); Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99, 103 (S.D. Ala. 1966). 
28. 430 F. Supp. 1154, 1162 (D. Neb. 1977). 
29. Id. (quoting Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1965)). 
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A. Jefferson, Madison, and First Amendment Federalism 
Within ten years after the adoption of the Constitution, the 
passage of the Federal Alien and Sedition Laws aroused a storm 
of protest that gave Jefferson an opportunity to comment publicly 
on his interpretation of the first amendment." In attacking these 
laws, Jefferson teamed with James Madi~on ,~ '  his longtime politi- 
cal ally. Madison's famous Memorial and Remon~trance"~ had 
cleared the way for the passage of Jefferson's Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom? They had collaborated on The Revisal of the 
Laws 1776-1786 of Virginia." And perhaps most importantly, Jef- 
ferson helped influence Madison to introduce the Bill of Rights 
as an amendment to the United States Constitution." Madison's 
comments on the meaning of the first amendment thus provide 
valuable insights into Jefferson's own thinking on the subject. 
Madison's intimate acquaintance with the legislative history 
of the first amendment served him well in his arguments against 
the Alien and Sedition Acts. A review of that legislative history 
is essential to an understanding of Madison's and Jefferson's sub- 
sequent thinking on the first amendment. Therefore, before pro- 
ceeding to Jefferson's and Madison's arguments against the Alien 
and Sedition Acts, the legislative history of the first amendment 
will be briefly detailed. 
1. Legislative history of the establishment clause 
When Madison's proposed amendment concerning religion 
first came out of congressional committee, it  read, "[Nlo religion 
shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of con- 
30. See generally The Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government, Preface 
to THE KENTUCKY-VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AND MR. MADISON'S REPORT OF 1799 (1960). 
31. Id. 
32. 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 162 (1865). 
33. 2 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 2, a t  545. 
34. Id. at 307. 
35. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Priestly (1802), reprinted in THOMAS JEFTER- 
SON ON DEMOCRACY 67 (S. Padover ed. 1939): 
I was in Europe when the Constitution was planned, and never saw it till 
after it was established. On receiving it I wrote strongly to Mr. Madison, urging 
the want of provision for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, trial by jury, 
habeas corpus, the substitution of militia for a standing army, and an express 
reservation to the States of all rights not specifically granted to the Union. He 
accordingly moved in the first session of Congress for these amendments, which 
were agreed to and ratified by the States as they now stand. This is all the hand 
I had in what related to the Constitution. 
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science be infringed.":16 This wording, however, could have been 
construed as prohibiting state as well as federal establishments 
of religion. The possibility of such an interpretation provoked 
proposals for a change in wording since a t  least seven of the states 
had officially established religions a t  the time the Constitution 
was adopted.37 Understandably, these states wanted to protect 
their state establishments from federal interference as well as 
guarantee that no national religion would be established by law. 
Consequently, the proposed amendment was rephrased in defer- 
ence to these state interests. 
Samuel Livermore, whose home state of New Hampshire 
made constitutional provision for the "support and maintenance 
of public protestant teachers of piety, religion, and m ~ r a l i t y , " ~ ~  
proposed that the language read "that Congress shall make no 
laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of cons~ience."~~ 
Such wording explicitly named Congress as the restricted body 
and would have prevented that body from passing any law, posi- 
tive or negative, on the subject of religion. Livermore's suggestion 
apparently influenced the final version of the amendment, as the 
House version that was sent to the Senate expressly mentioned 
Congress as the target of the amendment: "Congress shall make 
no law establishing Religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof. . . This version, however, still did not prohibit Con- 
gress from legislating against state establishments of religion. 
The joint committee which produced the final version incorpo- 
rated this prohibition by substituting the word "respecting" for 
" t o u ~ h i n g . " ~ ~  Thus, the phrase "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion" was intended to serve as 
a two-edged sword that would prevent federal action favoring or 
establishing religion while protecting state establishments from 
federal interference .42 
36. 1 ANNALS OF CONC. 729 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789). 
37. Kruse, The Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the Establishment 
of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 65, 94-107 (1962). 
These state establishments varied in degree but all shared the common vice of prefer- 
ring one religion over another. Among the states with state establishments were Connecti- 
cut (Congregational), Delaware (Christian), Maryland (Christian), Massachusetts (Con- 
gregational), New Hampshire (Protestant), New Jersey (Protestant), and South Carolina 
(Protestant). Id. at 95-106. 
38. 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER OR- 
GANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 2454 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909). 
39. 1 ANNALS OF CONC. 731 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (emphasis added). 
40. JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 104, 106 (1802), quoted in Snee, 
Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U L.Q. 371,386. 
41. Id. at 145, quoted in Snee, supra note 40, at  387. 
42. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION Q 1879 (1833). 
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That such was the intention of the Framers is evidenced by 
remarks made in the ratifying convention of North Carolina, a 
state that restricted the holding of state office to protest ant^.^^ 
When questioned as to the power of Congress to interfere with the 
states' jurisdiction over religious affairs, Mr. Iredell, a proponent 
of the Constitution, replied: "They [the federal government] 
certainly have no authority to interfere in the establishment of 
any religion whatsoever, and I am astonished that any gentleman 
should conceive that they have."44 James Madison had made the 
same point in the Virginia ratifying convention. Replying to the 
criticisms of Patrick Henry, Madison stated: "There is not a 
shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with 
religion. Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant 
u~urpa t ion . "~~  Madison, then, seems to have understood that the 
Constitution was intended to prevent federal intervention in 
state-level church-state relationships. The states, however, were 
left free to establish or disestablish as they saw fit. 
2. Madison's and Jefferson's attack on the Alien and Sedition 
Laws: More light on the meaning of the establishment clause 
In attacking the Federal Alien and Sedition Laws," Madison 
analogized the freedom of the press clause to the establishment 
The situation . . . of the different states equally proclaimed the policy, as 
well as the necessity of such an exclusion. In some of the states, episcopalians 
constituted the predominant sect; in others, presbyterians; in others, congrega- 
tionalists; in others, quakers; and in others again, there was a close numerical 
rivalry among contending sects. It  was impossible, that there should not arise 
perpetual strife and perpetual jealousy on the subject of ecclesiastical ascen- 
dancy, if the national government were left free to create a religious establish- 
ment. The only security was in extirpating the power. But this alone would have 
been imperfect security, if it had not been followed up by a declaration of the 
right of the free exercise of religion, and a prohibition (as we have seen) of all 
religious tests. Thus, the whole power over the subject of religion is left exclu- 
sively to the state governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense 
of justice, and the state constitutions; and the Catholic and the Protestant, the 
Calvinist and the Arminian, the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at  the 
common table of the national councils, without any icquisition into their faith, 
or mode of worship. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
43. 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER OR- 
GANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 2793 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909). 
44. 4 J .  ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 194 (2d ed. 1836). 
45. 3 id. at  330. 
46. James Madison's arguments against the Alien and Sedition Laws are contained 
in his report on the Virginia Resolution to the House of Delegates. THE KENTUCKY-VIRGINIA 
RESOLUTIONS AND MR. MADISON'S REPORT OF 1799, at 15-82 (1960). 
654 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
clause in order to prove that the federal government had no power 
over freedom of the press. In support of the laws, the Federalists 
had claimed that Congress had the power to regulate the press as 
long as freedom of the press was not abridged.47 Madison's answer 
to this argument reveals much concerning his interpretation of 
the religion clauses: 
Both of these rights, the liberty of conscience and of the 
press, rest equally on the original ground of not being delegated 
by the Constitution, and consequently withheld from the gov- 
ernment. Any construction therefore, that would attack this 
original security for the one must have the like effect on the 
other. . . . 
. . . .  
If the words and phrases in the amendment, are to be con- 
sidered as chosen with a studied discrimination, which yields an 
argument for a power over the press, under the limitation that 
its freedom be not abridged; the same argument results from the 
same consideration, for a power over the exercise of religion, 
under the limitation that its freedom be not prohibited. 
For if Congress may regulate the freedom of the press, pro- 
vided they do not abridge it: because i t  is said only, "they shall 
not abridge it;" and is not said, "they shall make no law respect- 
ing it:" the analogy of reasoning is conclusive, that Congress 
may regulate and even abridge the free exercise of religion; pro- 
vided they do not prohibit it; because i t  is said only "they shall 
not prohibit it;" and is not said "they shall make no law 
respecting or no law abridging it."48 
A careful reading of Madison's statement suggests that he under- 
stood the word "respecting" to be synonymous with Livermore's 
proposed word "touching," and that i t  was inserted in the estab- 
lishment clause in order to withhold all power from the federal 
government over the question of an establishment of religion. 
Jefferson's actions and writings tend to indicate that he 
agreed with Madison's interpretation of the religion clauses. In 
The Kentucky-Virginia Resolutions of 1798, Jefferson wrote: 
Resolved, that it is true as a general principle, as is also 
expressly declared by one of the amendments to the Constitu- 
tion that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively or to the people;" and that no power over 
the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the 
47. Id. at 59. 
48. Id. at 76-77 (emphasis in original). 
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press being delegated to the  United States by the  Constitution, 
nor prohibited by i t  to the  States, all lawful powers respecting 
the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the  States,  
or to the  people; That  thus  was m.anifestd their determination 
to retain to  themselves the  right of judging how far the licen- 
tiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged without 
lessening their useful freedom, and how far those abuses which 
cannot be separated from their use, should be tolerated rather 
than the use be destroyed; and thus  also they guarded against 
all abridgment by the  United States of the  freedom of  religious 
opinions and exercises, and retained to themselves the  right of 
protecting the  same, as this state by a Law passed on the general 
demand of its Citizens, had already protected them from all 
human restraint or interference: And that in addition to this 
general principle and express declaration, another and more 
special provision has been made by one of the amendments to 
the Constitution which expressly declares, that "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an Establishment of religion, or prohib- 
iting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or the press," thereby guarding in the same sentence, 
and under the same words, the freedom of religion, of speech, 
and of the press, insomuch, that whatever violates either, 
throws down the sanctuary which covers the others, and that 
libels, falsehoods, and defamation, equally with heresy and false 
religion, are withheld from the cognizance of federal tribunals.49 
Here, Jefferson coupled the tenth amendment with Madi- 
son's first amendment argument to show that all regulatory pow- 
ers over speech, press, and religion were reserved to the states by 
the Constitution. He maintained that these amendments limited 
not only Congress but the Supreme Court and, as will be shown 
below,50 the President as well. To Jefferson, the federal govern- 
ment had no more power to regulate the religious affairs of the 
states than it had power to interfere with the states' rights in the 
areas of speech and press. 
B. T h e  Danbury Letter: Federal Fast Days 
Versus State Fast Days 
Jefferson, then, saw the relationship of the federal govern- 
ment to religion as a problem in federalism, and he was careful 
throughout his Presidential administration to avoid exercising 
powers over religion that he felt had been reserved by the states. 
49. Id. a t  2-3 (emphasis added). Note that here Jefferson used the word "respecting" 
in the same tense that Madison used it; i.e., "touching upon" or "having to do with." 
50. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text infra. 
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An example of this concern is Jefferson's reply to a request by the 
Danbury Baptist Association that he as President declare a na- 
tional day of fasting. His letter to the association contains the 
famous wall-of-separation metahp~r .~ '  In a note to Levi Lincoln, 
his Attorney General, Jefferson said with regard to this matter: 
"The Baptist address, now enclosed, admits of a condemnation 
of the alliance between Church and State, under the authority of 
the Constitution. It furnishes an occasion, too, which I have long 
wished to find, of saying why I do not proclaim fastings & thanks- 
givings, as my predecessors did."" The context of this note evi- 
dences that Jefferson was concerned about the lack of Presiden- 
tial authority, under the Federal Constitution, to proclaim such 
a day. The Danbury letter itself suggests further that Jefferson 
had reference to the federal government only: "I contemplate 
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people 
which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respect- 
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and 
State."s3 Jefferson apparently felt that since the legislative power 
had been so limited, his power as President had been similarly 
limited. As President, he consistently refused to proclaim fast or 
thanksgiving days or even to recommend that they be observed.54 
In marked contrast to Jefferson's strict separationist attitude 
in the federal arena were his early actions relative to religion in 
the colonial and state government setting. In 1774 as a member 
of the Virginia House of Burgesses, Jefferson was personally in- 
volved in drafting and enacting a Resolution of the House of 
Burgesses Designating a Day of Fasting and Prayer. 
This House being deeply impressed with Apprehension of the 
great Dangers . . . from the hostile Invasion of the City of 
Boston, . . . deem it highly necessary that the said first Day of 
June be set apart by the Members of this House as a Day of 
Fasting, Humiliation, and Prayer, devoutly to implore the di- 
vine Interposition for averting the heavy Calamity . . . . 55 
51. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), 
reprinted in S. PADOVER, supra note 1, at 518. 
52. 9 WORKS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 346 (emphasis added). 
53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), 
reprinted in S. PADOVER, supra note 1, at 519 (emphasis added). 
54. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text infra. 
55. 1 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 2, at 105. Jefferson made no secret of his part 
in drafting the resolution, as revealed in this frank discussion of the matter from his 
autobiography: 
We were under conviction of the necessity of arousing our people from the 
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Although it might be argued that Jefferson did this only as 
a radical wartime measure when his strict separationist scruples 
were overcome by his revolutionary zeal, the argument will not 
stand in light of a similar bill that was later included in Jeffer- 
son's Revisal of the Laws." Entitled "A Bill for Appointing Days 
of Public Fasting and Thanksgiving" and introduced by James 
Madison October 31, 1785, this bill stands in direct conflict with 
most modern interpretations of the Danbury letter: 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly, that the power of ap- 
pointing days of public fasting and humiliation, or thanksgiv- 
ing, throughout this commonwealth, may in the recess of the 
General Assembly, be exercised by the Governor, or Chief Mag- 
istrate, with the advice of the Council; and such appointment 
shall be notified to the public, by a proclamation, in which the 
occasion of the fasting or thanksgiving shall be particularly set 
forth. Every minister of the gospel shall on each day so to be 
appointed, attend and perform divine service and preach a ser- 
mon, or discourse, suited to the occasion, in his church, on pain 
of forfeiting fifty pounds for every failure, not having a reasona- 
ble excuse.57 
A comparison of this bill with modern judicial doctrines con- 
cerning the meaning of the first amendment is a worthwhile exer- 
cise. In Lemon u. K u r t ~ m a n , ~ ~  Chief Justice Burger articulated a 
three-part test for measuring the constitutionality of state legisla- 
tion concerning religion or aid to religious institutions. First, the 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its pri- 
mary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and third, 
the statute must not foster excessive government entanglement 
with religion." One federal district judge linked this three-part 
test with Jefferson's wall: "In recent years the Supreme Court has 
lethargy into which they had fallen as to passing events; and thought that the 
appointment of a day of general fasting and prayer would be most likely to call 
up and alarm their attention . . . . With the help therefore of Rushworth, whom 
we rummaged over for the revolutionary precedents and forms of the Puritans 
of that day, . . . we cooked up  a resolution, somewhat modernizing their 
phrases, for appointing the 1st day of June, on which the port bill was to com- 
mence, for a day of fasting, humiliation and prayer, to  implore heaven to avert 
from us the evils of civil war, to inspire us with firmness in support of our rights, 
and to turn the hearts of the King and parliament to moderation and justice. 
Id. at  106. 
56. 2 id. at 556. The purpose of the 1776-1786 "Revisal" was to reform "the entire 
structure of law so as to strip it of all vestiges of its earlier monarchical aspects and to 
bring it into conformity with republican principles." Id. at  305. 
57. Id. at 556 (footnotes omitted). 
58. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
59. Id. at  612-13. 
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developed three tests to serve as guidelines to be used in deter- 
mining whether the 'wall of separation between church and state' 
has been b~eached."~~ 
This test might be applied to determine whether or not 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison breached the wall of sepa- 
ration between church and state with their fast day bill. First, 
there was no secular legislative purpose in the bill. Second, a 
primary effect of the bill was to advance religion by requiring the 
preaching of religious sermons a t  divine services. Third, how 
could a state officer avoid "excessive government entanglement 
with religion" as he fines a derelict minister fifty pounds or labors 
to ascertain whether or not the minister had a reasonable excuse 
for not preaching? The ironic conclusion inevitably follows that 
under current Supreme Court establishment clause standards, 
Jefferson's public fast day bill would be struck down as breaching 
his own wall of separation. I t  is apparent that Jefferson never 
thought his wall stood between the state "state" and the church. 
Again, some might assert that the fast day bills do not repre- 
sent Jefferson's more mature thinking on the subject, or that 
Jefferson believed the scope of state power over religious matters 
was altered by the adoption of the Constitution. Jefferson's pro- 
nouncements on the subject after the adoption of the Constitu- 
tion, however, reinforce the conclusion that the wall referred to 
in the Danbury letter was erected only against the federal govern- 
ment. In his second inaugural address, possibly replying to criti- 
cisms of his refusal to declare national religious holidays, Jeffer- 
son stated: 
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exer- 
cise is placed by the constitution independent of the powers of 
the general government. I have therefore undertaken, on no oc- 
casion, to prescribe the religious exercises suited to it; but have 
left them, as the constitution found them, under the direction 
and discipline of state or church authorities acknowledged by 
the several religious so~ieties.~~ 
Near the end of his Residency, Jefferson had another oppor- 
tunity to explain his position on the church-state issue under 
conditions similar to the Danbury circumstances. The Reverend 
Samuel Miller wrote and requested that Jefferson, as President, 
declare a national fast day. In his reply denying the request, 
Jefferson gave a much more thorough explanation of the reasons 
for his refusal. 
60. Americans United v. Benton, 413 F. Supp. 955, 959 (S.D. Iowa 1975). 
61. S. PADOVER, supra note 1, at 412. 
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I consider the government of the United States as interdicted by 
the Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, 
their doctrines, discipline, or exercises. This results not only 
from the provision that no law shall be made respecting the 
establishment or free exercise of religion, but from that also 
which reserves to the States the powers not delegated to the 
United States. Certainly, no power to prescribe any religious 
exercise, or to assume authority in religious discipline, has been 
delegated to the General Government. I t  must then rest with the 
States, as far as it can be in any human authority. . . . 
. . . a  
I am aware that the practice of my predecessors may be 
quoted. But I have ever believed, that the example of State 
executives led to the assumption of that authority by the Gen- 
eral Government, without due examination, which would have 
discovered that what might be a right in a State government, 
was a violation of that right when assumed by another.62 
Had Jefferson felt moved to employ the wall metaphor in this 
letter, he might have phrased it in these terms: The Federal Con- 
stitution has erected two walls-the first amendment and the 
tenth amendment. These walls stand as bulwarks against federal 
usurpation of power over religious institutions or sects. Since 
these walls cut off federal power over religious matters, these 
powers must rest with the states, as far as any government can 
legitimately exercise such powers. 
The documents and actions discussed above indicate Jeffer- 
son believed that the first and tenth amendments denied all three 
branches of the federal government any power, positive or nega- 
tive, over the religious activities of the people of the various 
states. All legitimate governmental powers over religious affairs 
in the states were reserved exclusively to the states, and any 
exercise by the federal government of these powers over religion 
was an unconstitutional usurpation of state authority. Jefferson's 
statement in the Miller letter that the power to prescribe religious 
exercises and to assume authority in religious discipline rested 
with the states "as far as it can be in any human authorityfls3 
leads to further investigation of his philosophy concerning the 
permissible extent of state authority in the area of religion. 
62. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Reverend Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), 
reprinted in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 428-29 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904). 
63. Id. 
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IV. JEFFERSON ON CHURCH AND STATE AT THE STATE LEVEL 
A. Modern Theories A bout the Definition of an Establishment 
Since the 1940 Cantwell v. Connecticutu4 decision applying 
the first amendment to the states through the fourteenth amend- 
ment, the Supreme Court has used the first amendment to strike 
down various state practices that the Court felt constituted 
"establishments of religion."" Two major theories concerning the 
meaning of the phrase "establishment of religion" have been ad- 
vanced in arguments before the Court. According to the first 
theory, which never found favor with the Court, the establish- 
ment clause bans only preferential treatment by government of 
one religion over another." This theory, which would allow 
state aid to or encouragement of religion on a nonpreferential 
basis, was advanced by various states in defense of what they 
considered to be nonpreferential aid-to-religion programs." The 
Supreme Court, taking its cue from Justice Black's famous state- 
ment in E ~ e r s o n , ~ ~  emphatically affirmed the second theory of 
"total separation-no aid" in the controversial Bible reading case, 
A bington School District o. S ~ h e m p p . ~ ~  
[Tlhis Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that 
the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference 
64. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
65. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (certain financial 
aid programs for nonpublic schools); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (antievolu- 
tion statutes); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (required Bible 
reading in schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (nondenominational official state 
prayers in schools); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) ( in-school released 
time religious education). 
66. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITW~ION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 190-91 (1958). 
67. R g . ,  the oral argument in the McCollurn case quoted in J. O'NEILL, RELIGION AND 
EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 225 (1949): 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK. Do I understand you to take the position that if the 
State of Illinois wanted to contribute five million dollars a year to religion they 
could do so, so long as they provided the same to every faith? 
MR. FRANKLIN. Yes, and the State of Illinois does contribute five million 
dollars annually to religious faiths, equally, and more than five million dollars, 
and has during its entire history. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK. How does it do it? 
MR. FRANKLIN. By tax exemptions specifically granted to religious organiza- 
tions. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK. Your pbition is that they could grant five million 
dollars a year to religion, if they wanted to, out of the taxpayer's money, so long 
as they treated all faiths the same? 
MR. FRANKLIN. Yes, Your Honor. That is our interpretation of the meaning 
of the first clause of the First Amendment. 
68. See text accompanying note 5 supra. 
69. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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of one religion over another. Almost 20 years ago in Everson . . . 
the Court said that "[nleither a state nor the Federal Govern- 
ment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."'O 
In more recent decisions, however, the Court has retreated 
somewhat from the extreme total separation-no aid rhetoric. In 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty u. 
N y q ~ i s t , ~ '  Justice Powell stated, "It has never been thought ei- 
ther possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation 
. . . ."72 Justice Blackmun reiterated this view in Roemer u. 
Board of Public Works." "The Court has enforced a scrupulous 
neutrality by the State, as among religions, and also as between 
religious and other activities, but a hermetic separation of the two 
is an impossibility it has never required."74 These dicta notwith- 
standing, the three-tiered Lemon test,75 which the Court contin- 
ues to apply,76 is essentially a no-aid-to-religion standard. It al- 
lows aid to religious institutions only for secular-not sectar- 
ian-purposes. 
B. Jefferson's Views on Establishment and Religious Freedom 
in Virginia 
Despite the Court's apparent backpedaling from the total 
separation position, Justice Powell in Nyquist persisted in the 
view that Thomas Jefferson advocated the total separation of 
church and state, even at the state level. "Thomas Jefferson's Bill 
for Establishing Religious Freedom . . . contained Virginia's first 
acknowledgement of the principle of total separation of Church 
and State."77 Dispute between total separationists and advocates 
of the no-preference theory has often centered around the ques- 
tion of which theory Thomas Jefferson adopted." The question 
arises because of the seemingly contradictory positions taken by 
Jefferson during his many years of public service. A close exami- 
nation of Jefferson's writings on the subject indicates that he 
likely held to neither extreme view; his was a compromise solu- 
70. Id. at 216 (emphasis added). 
71. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
72. Id. at 760. 
73. 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
74. Id. at 745-46 (footnote omitted). 
75. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra. 
76. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977). 
77. 413 U.S. at 770 n.28. 
78. Compare R. BUTTS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION 119
(1950) with J. O'NEILL, supra note 67, at 72-73. 
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tion. To Jefferson an establishment of religion meant one religion 
being officially preferred and privileged over others. He decried 
such preference and maintained that any state assistance to reli- 
gion should be equally available to all  religion^.'^ He also believed 
that even nonpreferential aid to all religions should be outlawed 
in specific instances if such aid might curtail religious freedom.R0 
It appears from Jefferson's writings that he attempted to strike a 
balance between two competing positions, possessing both a con- 
viction that successful free government was not secure unless the 
people believed in God and thus were led to act with m~ral i ty ,~ '  
and a belief that state encouragement of religion, if carried too 
far, could easily impair the right of free exercise of religion.R2 A 
study of Jefferson's state-level activities, both prior and subse- 
quent to his terms as President, reveals his lifelong efforts to 
achieve the proper balance in church-state relationships. The 
problem for Jefferson, then, was how to encourage religion and 
morality among the people without infringing upon their religious 
liberty. 
1.  Jefferson's preconstitutional church-state activities 
One of Jefferson's first public acts in Virginia on the subject 
of church and state relationships came in 1776 when he authored 
a Resolution for Disestablishing the Church of England and for 
Repealing Laws Interfering with Freedom of W o r ~ h i p . ~ ~  In part, 
the resolution stated: 
Resolved that it is the [opinion] of this [Committee] that so 
much of the [said] petitions as prays that the establishment of 
the Church of England by law in this Commonwealth may be 
discontinued, and that no pre-eminence may be allowed to any 
one Religious sect over another, is reasonable; & therefore that 
the several laws establishing the [said] Church of England, 
giving peculiar privileges to [the] ministers [thereofl, & levy- 
ing for the support thereof . . . contributions on the people 
independent of their good will ought to be repealed.84 
79. See notes 83-86 and accompanying text infra. 
80. See notes 93-106 and accompanying text infra. 
81. Jefferson wrote: "[Clan the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have 
removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties 
are of the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with his wrath?" 4 WORKS OF 
JEFFERSON, supra note 1, a t  83. 
82. For Jefferson, the very purpose of government was to protect the rights of men: 
"That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men . . . ." DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE. 
83. 1 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 2, at  530. 
84. Id. 
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From this statement it is clear Jefferson believed that no prefer- 
ence for one religion over another should be shown by state gov- 
ernment. Jefferson himself stated that the resolution was written 
for the purpose of "discontinuing the establishment of the Church 
of England by law, & [thereby] taking away the privilege & pre- 
eminence of one religious sect over another, and thereby 
[establish[ing] . . . equal rights among all]."s 
Jefferson's effort in 1776 to disestablish the Church of Eng- 
land as the official state church of Virginia was only partially 
successful, resulting in a compromise measure whereby the 
Church of England remained the official state church but dissen- 
ters were exempted from levies in support of the The 
exempting bill specifically reserved for later resolution the ques- 
tion of "the Propriety of a general Assessment or whether every 
religious society should be left to voluntary Contributions for the 
support and maintenance of the several Ministers and Teachers 
of the Gospel . . . ."" This issue came to a head eight years later 
when Patrick Henry introduced his "Bill Establishing a Provision 
for Teachers of the Christian Religion."" The measure provided 
that each taxpayer could designate "to what society of Chris- 
t i a n ~ ' ' ~ ~  his money should go. The sums thus collected were to be 
"appropriated to a provision for a Minister or Teacher of the 
Gospel . . . or the providing places of divine worship, and to none 
other use whatsoever . . . . "90 
Henry's proposed tax provoked Madison's Memorial and 
Remonstranceg1 that condemned the proposal as a legal establish- 
ment of the Christian religion. Madison's language showed that 
he, like Jefferson, believed state government should not prefer 
one religion over others. 
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish 
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish 
with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclu- 
sion of all other Sects? . . . 
. . . [Tlhe bill violates that equality which ought to be the 
basis of every law . . . . As the Bill violates equality by subject- 
85. Id. at 531 n.1 (brackets and emphasis in original). 
86. Id. at 531. 
87. Id. at 533. 
88. This document is reproduced in the supplementary appendix to Everson v. Board 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 72 (Rutledge, J. ,  dissenting). 
89. Id. at 73. 
90. Id. at 74. 
91. 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 162 (1865). 
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ing some to peculiar burdens, so it violates the same principle, 
by granting to others peculiar  exemption^.^^ 
I t  seems clear from the above that both Jefferson and Madi- 
son felt government should show no preference for one religion 
over another. What is not clear is whether Jefferson would have 
approved of governmental aid to all religious on a nonpreferential 
basis. Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious FreedomB (en- 
acted shortly after the Remonstrance had laid Henry's bill to rest) 
is often cited to support the notion that Jefferson not only be- 
lieved in nonpreferential treatment of religion, but also opposed 
all governmental aid to religion and advocated total separation 
of church and state.g4 
The operative language of the bill read: 
We the General Assembly of Virginia do enact that no man shall 
be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, 
place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, 
molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise 
suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all 
men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their 
opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no 
wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacitiesg5 
This language outlawed three evils: (1) compelling a man to at- 
tend religious services; (2) forcing a man to support any religious 
"worship, place, or ministry"; and (3) punishing a man on ac- 
count of his religious beliefs. In addition, the bill affirmatively 
declared man's natural rightn to profess and contend for his reli- 
gious opinions. 
The preamble language concerning forced support reveals 
that his portion of the bill was designed to eliminate two prac- 
tices: taxes supporting establishment of one preferred state reli- 
gion, and general tax assessments to pay ministerial salaries and 
build sectarian edifices for all religions. Preferential establish- 
ment was condemned in severe language: 
[ v h e  impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as 
well as ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and 
uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of oth- 
ers, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the 
92. Id. at 163-64. 
93. 2 PAPERS OF J ~ R S O N ,  supra note 2, at 545. 
94. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 n.28 (1973). 
95. 2 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 2, at 546 (emphasis in original) (footnotes 
omitted). 
96. Id. at 546-47. 
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only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose 
them on others, hath established and maintained false religions 
over the greatest part of the world and through all time: That 
to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the prop- 
agation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful 
and tyrannical . . . . 97 
The language condemning general assessments was much softer, 
although it broadened the prohibition beyond the scope of 
Henry's bill (which was in effect the establishment of the 
Christian religion) to cover an assessment used to support minis- 
ters and teachers of every religion, not only Christianity. Jeffer- 
son condemned general assessments on the ground that they in- 
terfered with religious freedom: "[Tlhat even the forcing [a 
man] to support this or that teacher of his own religious persua- 
sion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his 
contributions to the particular pastor whose morals he would 
make his pattern, and whose powers he feels most persuasive to 
righteousness . . . ."g8 To conclude, however, that because the 
bill outlawed tax support of religion it was designed as a "wall of 
separation between church and state" or that it was intended to 
effect a "total separation" is to ignore historical realities. 
The religious freedom bill was the first of a group of five 
consecutive bills in Jefferson's "Revisal" dealing with religion. 
The religious freedom bill itself began with language which might 
be offensive to some total separationists: 
Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his 
supreme will that free it shall remain by making it altogether 
insusceptible of restraint; that all attempts to influence it by 
temporal punishments . . . are a departure from the plan of the 
holy author of our religion, who being lord both of body and 
mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as 
was in his Almighty power to do, but to extend it by its influence 
on reason alone . . . . 99 
The second bill was entitled "A Bill for Saving the Property 
of the Church Heretofore by Law Established,"lM and was de- 
signed to protect the property rights of the recently disestablished 
Anglican Church. It was, in a sense, a bill which aided "one 
religion." The third bill of the group was called "A Bill for Pun- 
97. Id. at 545. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 553. 
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ishing Disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath Breakers."Iu1 
This Act prohibited officers of the law from arresting a clergyman 
while he was preaching in church, and imposed a fine and impris- 
onment on anyone who might "maliciously, or contemptuously, 
disquiet or disturb any congregation assembled in any church, 
chapel, or meeting-house . . . ."lo2 This part of the bill was 
clearly directed at benefiting "all religions." The bill also out- 
lawed working on Sunday, but in keeping with the religious free- 
dom bill, did not require attendance at church in order to avoid 
the penalties for Sabbath breaking.'" The fourth enactment was 
the Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fasting and Thanksgiving 
discussed above.lo4 This bill stood virtually back to back with the 
religious freedom bill, yet is irreconcilable with modern concep- 
tions of the Danbury "wall of separation." The last act of the 
group, entitled "A Bill Annulling Marriages Prohibited by the 
Levitical Law,"'05 enacted Biblical law by reference: "Be it en- 
acted by the General Assembly, that marriages prohibited by the 
Levitical law shall be null; and persons marrying contrary to that 
prohibition, and cohabitating as man and wife, convicted thereof 
in the General Court, shall be amerced [fined], from time to 
time, until they separate."lw 
These five bills serve to demonstrate that if Jefferson be- 
lieved in any impregnable wall at the state level, it most likely 
was not between religion generally and the state, but between 
religious freedom and the powers of the state. In his view legiti- 
mate state interaction with religious institutions was both neces- 
sary and permissible. State practices infringing upon religious 
freedom, including the establishment of an officially preferred 
religion and general assessments for direct support of all religions, 
were outlawed by Jefferson in his religious freedom bill. To Jeffer- 
son, however, this did not mean the total separation of church 
and state such that no religion or religious influence was to be 
permitted in state-sponsored activities and laws. State declara- 
tion of days of rest and public fasts were specifically within the 
proper realm of church-state relations. In his state-level actions 
and legislation Jefferson emphasized religious freedom and legal 
equality among the sects, but allowed for what he considered 
101. Id. at 555. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra. 
105. 2 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 2, at 556. 
106. Id. at 556-57. 
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legitimate interaction, cooperation, and encouragement between 
church and state. Whether his attitude changed in the post- 
Presidential period of his life, after the Danbury letter, will be the 
next subject of inquiry. 
2. Jefferson's post-Presidential thinking on church and state 
In 1822, Jefferson wrote a letter to Doctor Thomas Cooper in 
which he expressed some of his views on religion and religious 
fanaticism: 
The atmosphere of our country is unquestionably charged with 
a threatening cloud of fanaticism, lighter in some parts, denser 
in others, but too heavy in all. I had no idea, however, that in 
Pennsylvania, the cradle of toleration and freedom of religion, 
it could have arisen to the height you describe. This must be 
owing to the growth of Presbyterianism. . . . Their ambition 
and tyranny would tolerate no rival if they had power. System- 
atical in grasping at  an ascendency over all other sects, they 
aim, like the Jesuits, at engrossing the education of the country, 
are hostile to every institution which they do not direct, and 
jealous at seeing others begin to attend at  all to that object.lo7 
Here Jefferson revealed his fear that intolerance and religious 
fanaticism would lead to a loss of religious freedom and an offi- 
cial, preferential establishment of one sect. This possibility was 
abhorrent to Jefferson. On another occasion he had stated, "I am 
for freedom of religion, and against all maneuvres to bring about 
a legal ascendancy of one sect over another . . . ."log In contrast, 
Jefferson praised examples of harmony and toleration among the 
sects: 
In Boston, however, and its neighborhood, Unitarianism has 
advanced to so great strength, as now to humble this haughtiest 
of all religious sects; insomuch that they condescend to inter- 
change with them and the other sects, the civilities of preaching 
freely and frequently in each others' meeting-houses. . . . In our 
village of Charlottesville, there is a good degree of religion, with 
a small spice only of fanaticism. We have four sects, but without 
either church or meeting-house. The court-house is the common 
temple, one Sunday in the month to each. Here, Episcopalian 
and Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist, meet together, join in 
107. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cmper (Nov. 2, 1822), reprinted 
in 12 WORKS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 270-71. 
108. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (1799), reprinted in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON O  DEMOCRACY 31 (S. Padover ed. 1939). 
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hymning their Maker, listen with attention and devotion to each 
others' preachers, and all mix in society with perfect harmony.'09 
The student of Jefferson is led to ask, "Where is the wall of 
separation between church and state when the courthouse is used 
as the common temple of all the religious sects of a village?" 
Jefferson made .no objection to this arrangement, probably be- 
cause it was the very antithesis of intolerance. With such har- 
mony among the sects, an establishment of one in preference to 
others would have been extremely unlikely, and religious freedom 
would have remained unthreatened by religious fanaticism. This 
may be why it seems never to have occurred to Jefferson that 
using the courthouse as a temple might be seen as a violation of 
his Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom as compelling a man 
to support a "religious place." The ideal for Jefferson at the state 
level seems not to have been total separation, but religious liberty 
and religious tolerance. If these ends were fulfilled, the accommo- 
dation of religion by allowing impartial use of a state-owned 
building for religious services seems not to have been repugnant 
to his church-state scruples. 
This attitude is particularly apparent in Jefferson's activities 
in public education. He consistently opposed official arrange- 
ments that might have led to intolerance or the ascendancy of one 
sect over others, while he favored ideas that encouraged tolerance 
and religious peace. In his Bill for Establishing Elementary 
Schools11o of 1817, Jefferson sought to exclude ministers from 
serving as "Visitors," i.e., school board members, of the primary 
schools. By way of explanation, he stated, "Ministers of the gos- 
pel are excluded to avoid jealousy from the other sects, were the 
public education committed to a particular one . . . ."ll' This, 
however, did not mean that all religion was to be excluded from 
the schools. Jefferson maintained that there was a core of belief 
common to all the sectsu2 and in his view, this common core could 
be included in public education without offense. He wrote in the 
same bill: "[Nlo religious reading, instruction or exercise, shall 
be prescribed or practiced inconsistent with the tenets of any 
religious sect or denomination. "113 
109. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822) reprinted 
in 12 WORKS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 270-71. 
110. EARLY HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA S CONTAINED IN THE LET~ERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON A D JOSEPH C. CABELL 96-97 (J. Randolph ed. 1856) [hereinafter cited 
as EARLY HISTORY]. 
111. Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
112. See note 81 supra. 
113. EARLY HISTORY, supra note 110, at 98 (emphasis added). A state law requiring 
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Jefferson's later actions in public education followed this 
same pattern. In the Rockfish Gap Report of 1818,114 which con- 
tained Jefferson's preliminary proposals for the establishment of 
the University of Virginia, religion was included as an integral 
part of the plans. His suggestion for providing facilities for reli- 
gious worship contemplated nonpreferential 'access to what, 
under the language of the Bill for Establishing Religious Free- 
dom, could be considered a tax-supported "religious place. "*15 "It 
is supposed probable that a building of somewhat more size in the 
middle of the grounds may be called for in time, in which may 
be rooms for religious worship, under such impartial regulations 
as the Visitors shall prescribe . . . ."l16 Jefferson apparently felt 
such a plan would not be a violation of his Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom. This serves to illustrate further that when 
Jefferson outlawed tax support of a religious place he had in mind 
Henry's general assessment, which contemplated public support 
to build sectarian chapels. As Jefferson stated in the religious 
freedom bill, such an assessment for the support of ministers and 
sectarian chapels deprived a man of the liberty of choosing to 
which pastor he would voluntarily contribute. Jefferson appar- 
ently felt, however, that any minor curtailment of religious free- 
dom that might result from allowing all of the sects a place to 
meet and hold religious exercises at a tax-supported university 
was outweighed by the policy of encouraging religion and moral- 
ity among the people. As in the case of the courthouse "temple" 
in Charlottesville, such nonpreferential use of a public place for 
religious service seems not to have been a contravention of Jeffer- 
son's church-state philosophies. 
3. "Schools on the Confines9'-An example of Jefferson's 
approach 
Jefferson planned to include religious teachings in the Uni- 
versity of Virginia's curriculum in a way calculated to encourage 
morality and a belief in God while at the same time avoiding a 
preferential establishment of one sect's beliefs over those of an- 
other. 
- - - 
the in-school recitation of a "denominationally neutral" prayer that apparently would 
have met the standard Jefferson prescribed here was struck down in Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421, 430 (1962) because it "breache[d] the constitutional wall of separation between 
church and state." Id. at 425. 
114. EARLY HISTORY, supra note 110, at 432. 
115. See note 95 and accompanying text supra. 
116. EARLY HISTORY, supra note 110, at 434. 
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In conformity with the principles of our Constitution, which 
places all sects of religion on an equal footing, with the jealous- 
ies of the different sects in guarding that equality from en- 
croachment and surprise, and with the sentiments of the Legis- 
lature in favor of freedom of religion, manifested on former occa- 
sions, we have proposed no professor of divinity; and the rather 
as the proofs of the being of a God, the creator, preserver, and 
supreme ruler of the universe, the author of all the relations of 
morality, and of the laws and obligations these infer, will be 
within the province of the professor of ethics; to which adding 
the developments of these moral obligations, of those in which 
all sects agree, with a knowledge of the languages, Hebrew, 
Greek, and Latin, a basis will be formed common to all sects. 117 
This balanced solution overcame constitutional problems in 
Jefferson's view by not allowing any sect to gain preeminence. In 
Jefferson's mind such a plan did not constitute an establishment 
of religion, nor did it infringe on religious liberty. In fact, Jeffer- 
son later stated his belief that there should be no "public estab- 
lishment of any religious instruction" at the university.l18 The 
context of this statement indicates he was speaking of sectarian 
religious instruction, as the plan obviously involved what most 
would consider religious instruction. 
The failure to provide any means by which a student could 
be educated in the tenets of his own particular religion, however, 
provoked criticism of the university. In a personal letter, Jeffer- 
son wrote: 
In our university you know there is no Professorship of Divinity. 
A handle has been made of this, to disseminate an idea that this 
is an institution, not merely of no religion, but against all reli- 
gion. Occasion was taken at  the last meeting of the Visitors, to 
bring forward an idea that might silence this calumny, which 
weighed on the minds of some honest friends to the institu- 
tion.l19 
The "idea" is put forth in Jefferson's "Schools on the Confines" 
proposal of 1822: 
I t  was not, however, to be understood that instruction in 
religious opinions and duties was meant to be precluded by the 
public authorities as indifferent to the interests of society; on 
the contrary, the relations which exist between man and his 
117. Id. at 441 (emphasis added). 
118. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), reprinted 
in 12 WORKS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 272. 
119. Id. 
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Maker, and the duties resulting from those relations, are the 
most interesting and important to every human being, and the 
most incumbent on his study and investigation. The want of 
instruction in the various creeds of religious faith existing 
among our citizens presents, therefore, a chasm in a general 
institution of the useful sciences . . . . A remedy, however, has 
been suggested . . . which . . . excludes the public authorities 
from the domain of religious freedom . . . . It has, therefore, 
been in contemplation, and suggested by some pious individu- 
als, who perceive the advantages of associating other studies 
with those of religion, to establish their religious schools on the 
confines of the University, so as to give their students ready and 
convenient access and attendance on the scientific lectures of 
the University . . . . 120 
This proposal obviously provided educational advantages to fu- 
ture theological students, as their religious schools would now be 
associated with the university, but Jefferson also envisioned re- 
ciprocal benefits accruing to the full-time students a t  the univer- 
sity. 
Such establishments would offer the further and great advan- 
tage of enabling students of the University to attend religious 
exercises with the professor of their particular sect, either in the 
rooms of the building still to be erected, and destined to that 
purpose under impartial regulations, as proposed in the same 
report of the Commissioners, or in the lecturing room of such 
professor. 121 
Jefferson specifically gave his approval in this proposal to 
religious exercises conducted in a state-owned school building by 
a minister-professor from outside the scho01.l~~ Jefferson's 1824 
"Regulations for the University" show the importance he at- 
tached to attendance at  these religious exercises. He envisioned 
a program of early morning seminary attendance for all university 
students: 
Should the religious sects of this State, or any of them, 
according to the invitation held out to them, establish within, 
or adjacent to, the precincts of the University, schools for in- 
struction in the religion of their sect, the students of the Univer- 
sity will be free, and expected to attend religious worship a t  the 
establishment of their respective sects, . . . in time to meet 
their school in the University a t  its stated 
120. EARLY HISTORY, supra note 110, a t  474. 
121. Id. a t  475. 
122. This sounds similar to the in-school released time religious inst.ruct,ion program 
struck down by the Supreme Court in McCollum. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 
U.S. 203 (1948). 
123. S. PADOVER, supra note 1, a t  1110. 
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The plan concluded with an assurance that the regulations 
of the university "should be so modified and a c c ~ m o d a t e d " ~ ~ ~  so 
as to give seminary students access to the university library. Jef- 
ferson asserted finally that his plans "would fill the chasm now 
existing on principles [while leaving] inviolate the constitutional 
freedom of religion, the most unalienable and sacred of all human 
rights. " lZ5 Jefferson's comments in his letter to Thomas Cooper 
further revealed his thoughts on the plan: 
In our annual report to the legislature, after stating the constitu- 
tional reasons against a public establishment of any religious 
instruction, we suggest the expediency of encouraging the differ- 
ent religious sects to establish, each for itself, a professorship of 
their own tenets, on the confines of the university, so near as 
that their students may attend the lectures there, and have the 
free use of our library, and every other accomodation we can give 
them; preserving, however, their independence of us and of each 
other . . . . I think the invitation will be accepted, by some 
sects from candid intentions, and by others from jealousy and 
rivalship. And by bringing the sects together, and mixing them 
with the mass of other students, we shall soften their asperities, 
liberalize and neutralize their prejudices, and make the general 
religion a religion of peace, reason and m0ra1ity.l~~ 
Jefferson saw the plan as an opportunity to do away with religious 
intolerance-an enemy of religious freedom-and replace it with 
an attitude of peace and harmony. This state accommodation 
and encouragement of religion would thus promote religious free- 
dom, an end Jefferson consistently sought. 
Thomas Jefferson apparently had a more complex view of 
church-state relationships than his metaphorical expression of "a 
wall of separation," taken in isolation, would indicate. While 
Jefferson believed control of sectarian religious instruction should 
remain independent of state power, his standards of church-state 
relationships at the state level, rather than being a wall of separa- 
tion, seems to have been one of impartial accommodation. 
A careful analysis of Jefferson's beliefs and actions concern- 
ing church-state relationships demonstrates that a strict separa- 
tionist interpretation of his wall-of-separation metaphor is incon- 
124. EARLY HISTORY, supra note 110, at 475 (emphasis added). 
125. Id. 
126. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), reprinted 
in 12 WORKS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 272 (emphasis added). 
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sistent with his intent. Jefferson believed the federal government 
should not interfere with the relationship between state govern- 
ments and religion. His refusal to declare national fast days was 
based on his belief that the President and Congress constitution- 
ally lacked such power. The states, on the other hand, were con- 
stitutionally left free to regulate church-state relationships. How- 
ever, even state involvement with religion was not without 
boundaries in Jefferson's view. The Bill for Religious Freedom 
was designed to protect religious freedom by outlawing direct 
subsidies to religion. 
Jefferson's model, then, left the free exercise of religion pro- 
tected from federal as well as state power, with the legitimate 
regulation of religious matter in the hands of the states, protected 
from federal interference. As Jefferson saw it, the states were left 
free, under the Constitution, to develop what they deemed to be 
the proper relationship with religion. In Virginia, Jefferson devel- 
oped a standard of impartial accommodation in church-state af- 
fairs. 
The Supreme Court's present church-state model differs 
from Jefferson's in that the Court, as a federal authority, has not 
seen the first and tenth amendments as walls precluding its ad- 
dressing church-state questions on the state level. Instead, the 
Court has coupled the first and fourteenth amendments to take 
jurisdiction over such issues.12' In further contrast to Jefferson's 
thinking, the Court has imposed upon church-state relationships 
a standard of no aid for religious purposes. 
Whether or not one agrees with Supreme Court review of 
state actions concerning religion, the reliance of the Court on 
Thomas Jefferson to justify the results of that review seems out 
of harmony with the political philosophy of the famous Virginian. 
It is suggested that, if the Court invokes the Jefferson metaphor 
in reaching its church-state conclusions in state-level cases, an 
approach more consistent with Jeffersonian philosophy might be 
127. While the application of the free exercise clause to the states through the four- 
teenth amendment may be historically justifiable, incorporation of the establishment 
clause through the fourteenth amendment presents different problems since, as point.ed 
out above, the original intent of the clause seems to have been to deny federal authority 
over state-level establishment-of-religion questions. However, no detailed analysis of t.he 
issue of incorporation has been attempted here, as that issue has been dealt with ade- 
quately elsewhere. See, e.g., Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 
LAW & CONTEMP. ROB. 3, 16-20 (1949); Kruse, supra note 37, at 110-414; O'Brien, The 
Statutes and "No Establishment": Proposed Amendments to the Constitution Since 1798, 
4 W A ~ H ~ U R N  L.J. 183 (1965); Snee, supra note 40. 
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to apply his state-level standard of impartial accommodation 
rather than the federal standard of a "wall of separation." 
Joel F. Hansen 
